## **TCAC Chair's Thematic Comparative Table and Suggestions**

Themes	EU Proposal <sup>i</sup>	Coastal States Proposal <sup>ii</sup>	Chair's Comments <sup>iii</sup> and Suggestions (Includes comments of current Chair and those of previous Chair)
PREAMBLE	EU Proposal contains a preamble [pages 2-3]  Objectives of IOTC Rights and Duties of Coastal	Coastal States' Proposal contains a preamble [pages 3-4]	A preamble is not necessary and may be superfluous with content of general principles
	States under UNCLOS, UNFSA, etc.	IOTC Objectives	Generally, a preamble should speak to the
	Rights and Duties of all States	Ref to IOTC Agreement	(historic) context for the text, and provide the
	KOBE recommendations regarding by-catch; scientific efforts, reduced capacity, decision-	Rights and Duties of Coastal States under UNCLOS, UNFSA, etc.	general purpose and objectives
	making and compliance and enforcement Ref to IOTC Resolution 15/10 for ending overfishing and rebuilding biomass of stocks in red quadrant	Rights and Duties of all States UNGA Resolution 70/75 (2015) para 140 KOBEII and III on freezing fishing capacity and transfer of capacity from developed fishing members to developing coastal fishing members Special requirements of developing States, in particular least-developed and SIDS in UNCLOS, UNFSA, FAO Code of Conduct, FAO Compliance Agreement, FAO IPOAs, and UNGA Resolutions	Previous Chair Comment: Normal treaty drafting practice is to draft the Preamble last, since it will need to take account of the agreement reached on the substantive articles. Medium degree of difficulty
DEFINITIONS	No definition section, but terms are defined throughout the text of the proposal	Pages 4-5 contains definitions for:  Allocation period Coastal fisheries Contracting Party Cooperating Non-Contracting Party (CNCP)	Definitions are only required if uncommon or unclear terms are used, and if used more than once, throughout the text of the Allocation regime – or else specific definition(s) can be inserted where such terms are used
		CPC Distant Water Fishing (DWF) CPC Coastal State CPC Developing Coastal State (DCS) CPC	Where definitions are already provided by IOTC Treaty or CMM, it is not necessary to include them in the Allocation regime text

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		New Entrant Small Island Developing States (SIDS) CPC Temporary transfer Global Total Allowable Catch (GTAC) Conservation and Management Measures (CMM)	Some proposed definitions actually contain substantive principles or rules, and should be removed from the definition section and moved to the appropriate substantive section
PURPOSE	Clause 1 (page 3) appears to include a purpose	Purpose clause included in Allocation Principles section II, clause 14 chapeau (page 5), and in page 6, section III Allocation Criteria, clause 15(a)	A Purpose clause is not essential and normally better suited for the preamble section.  But if included, it should reflect the mandate provided by the Commission to the TCAC
Theme 1: GENERAL PRINCIPLES  Whether general principles are required  Scope of principles	Section on Main Principles on pages 3-4, clauses 1 to 7	Section II Allocation Principles on pages 5-6	Some ideas in principles sections of both proposals are repetitive of clauses in preambles of both proposals. May wish to consider what should figure in preamble section and what should be contained in principles section.  Principles should be high level. Some are too detailed or specific to be considered principles.  Some principles contained in both proposals are more suited to eligibility, scope or substantive provisions of the proposal.  Scope of principles could include the following core elements:  - Fair, equitable and transparent allocation process and outcomes

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			<ul> <li>Establishment of TAC as basis for Allocation regime</li> <li>Allocation regime supporting effective management of fishing capacity and supporting sustainable management of IOTC stocks and ecosystem</li> <li>Non-prejudice to rights and legal obligations under various instruments</li> <li>Recognition of social and economic dependency of Developing Coastal States (DCS) and Small Island Developing States SIDs</li> <li>Addressing special requirements of DCS and SIDs</li> <li>Previous Chair Comments: Elements contained in both Proposals are reasonably similar, and should</li> </ul>
			be relatively easy to negotiate [Straightforward degree of difficulty]

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Theme 2: ELIGIBILITY			
Who should be eligible to IOTC allocations	Page 3, Main Principles section, clause 3 Eligibility restricted to Members, Cooperating	Page 5, section II, clause 14(a) and Page 6, section III, clause 16:	Coastal States Proposal suggests creating an incentive for CNCPs to become Contracting
Whether and what conditions should be imposed to be eligible to receive allocations from IOTC	Non-Members and long term participating non- Contracting Parties	Eligibility restricted to IOTC Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties in a manner to encourage them to become Contracting Parties	Parties. EU Proposal embeds such an incentive by allocating only 80% of their allocations.
- Contracting Parties - Cooperating Non- Contracting Parties			
- New Entrants	Page 5, Clause 14 provides for specific eligibility for a set aside of 1% of the TAC for New Entrants by requiring that they have an (undefined) real interest in the fishery	Page 9, section III, clause 23(a) and (b) provide for specific rules for New Entrants that have become new Coastal States Contracting Parties, and those that have become new Distant Water Fishing Contracting Parties. Both groups are	
- Non Contracting Parties	Page 6, clause 18 limits the eligibility of Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties to 80% of their allocation	required to apply for and obtain authorization from the Commission to obtain an allocation.	
- Commission fees paid in full	Nothing provided	Nothing provided	Considered by other RFMOs, though challenging for CNCPs
- Nominal catch data reported	Page 3, Main principles section, clause 4, renders ineligible to an allocation for a year, a CPC that fails to report nominal catch data for that year	Nothing provided	

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Theme 3: SCOPE	Page 3, Main Principles section, clause 1: Allocation for stocks covered by the IOTC Agreement on a stock by stock basis, applied in a	Page 6, Section III, clause 15(b) geographical scope IOTC Area of Competence	The terms "stocks" and "species" are used interchangeably in both proposals. IOTC species are managed throughout their range, so either
Geographical Area Species	gradual manner, starting with stocks in the upper left quadrant (red) of the KOBE Plot  Clause 2 specifies that the allocation regime shall	Clause 17(a) Allocation by species - species limited to albacore, bigeye tuna, skipjack tuna, yellowfin tuna and swordfish	term could work, though typically, stock would be the better term. May wish to consider term used elsewhere in IOTC documents.
Gear-types	apply to all fishing gears		Should allocations be set on a limited number of IOTC species/stocks, or for all IOTC regulated species/stocks? Are there practical, information related or legal reasons for limiting the species/stocks subject to the Allocation regime?
			Members could consider a gradual or phased implementation approach for establishing allocations (see suggestions under Theme 8)
Theme 4: ALLOCATION STRUCTURE	Page 3, Main principles, clause 3 describes the general structure proposed for the allocation regime:  1) Initial baseline allocation for al CPCs; and 2) A complementary and new entrants allocations to be adjusted by certain corrections factors	Page 6, Section III Allocation criteria, Clause 16 Eligibility, paragraph (b) describes the general structure proposed for the allocation regime:  1) A baseline allocation with 2 components: a baseline Coastal State allocation and a baseline historical catch allocation;  2) A supplementary allocation; and,  3) A correction factor allocation with multiple components	Both proposals and discussions to date seem to favour an allocation structure divided in 3 groups: Historical Catch Allocation; Supplementary/Complementary Allocation and Corrections for Developing States Allocations. What is included in each group varies by proposal, especially where and how Coastal States' aspirations are treated, but most generally recognized allocation factors are included overall in both proposals
			Both proposals contain some similar elements in their allocation structures. They both contain historical catches as part of their baseline

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			allocations. The Coastal States Proposal defines Baseline Allocations beyond historical catch and assigns a percentage of the TAC to Coastal States based on specific criteria. The EU Proposal restricts Baseline Allocations to historical catches, but brings in added criteria under a Supplementary Allocation. Both Proposals contain a basic allocation to be shared by all CPCs. And both provide for adjustments and corrections based on specific Factors, though how this is done, and eligibility varies.  The most important difference between the two proposals is how they treat historical catches within EEZs. The Coastal States' proposal gives 100% attribution of such catches to Coastal States, irrespective of the flag of the catching vessels, and the EU proposes to attribute a percentage [10%] of the current catch history to the Coastal States, with the balance [90%] attributed to the flag States of the catching vessels.  Previous Chair Comments: These different concepts and approaches make negotiation on the elements quite difficult and complex, and this is exacerbated by the level of complexity involved in some elements of the proposals.
			[Very Difficult degree of difficulty]

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A. BASELINE/	The EU Proposal defines an Initial Baseline	The Coastal States' proposal defines	
HISTORICAL CATCH	Allocation based on historical catch within EEZ and	Its baseline allocation comprising	
ALLOCATION	on the high seas and comprises [80%] of the TAC	2 components [Page 6, Secion 16(b)(i)]:	
	Page 3, Section Main Principles, clause 3, and		
	clause 8	a Baseline Coastal State	
		Allocation [25%-45% of TAC] [Page 7,	
		Section III Allocation Criteria, Clause	
		19]; and	
		2) a Baseline Historical Catch	
		Allocation [60%-80%	
		of TAC] [Page 8, Section III,	
		Clause 20]	
		The <u>Baseline Coastal State Allocation</u>	
		(BCSA) [Page 7, Clause 19] is defined by criteria:	
		Each Coastal State CPC with catch	
		history is to receive an entitlement	
		("status weighting") based on:	
		[050/] [ 050	
		- [35%] of BCSA shared equally amongst Coastal State CPCs;	
		amongst coustar state or es,	
		- [47.5%] of BCSA shared	
		amongst Developing Coastal State CPCs	
		based on development status – Details	
		are fleshed out for HDI, GNI, SIDs status	
		and associated weighting;	
		- [17.5%] of BCSA shared based on sizes	

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		of EEZs in IOTC Area – Details are fleshed out for weighting to be attributed to various sizes of EEZs. This criteria may eventually be replaced by one that shares a % of the BCSA based on relative abundance of species being allocated, in individual Coastal States' waters, when such abundance is (can be) estimated by the Scientific Committee (see IOTC-2018-S22-PropK Rev1)  *Coastal State CPCs without species catch history may request Baseline Coastal State Allocation [clause 19(b)]  *A Cap of no more than 50% of the lowest Baselin allocation for any Coastal State Contracting Party is set for Coastal State Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties [clause 19(c)]  Baseline Historical Catch Allocation is based on catch within the EEZ and on the high seas [Page 8, Section III Allocation Criteria, clause 20]	
- Catch Reference Period	Catch period 2000-2016	2 options are proposed: 5 year average (2012-16), or 15 year average (2002-16)	While recognizing this may result in a more complex regime, would identifying different periods for each stock resolve some of the issues raised by some delegations?

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- Impacts of past non- compliance on catch history	Nothing provided	Nothing provided	Considered by other RFMOs Consider whether past overfishing or illegally caught catches should be counted for historical catch allocation
Attribution:  - Spatial distribution of Catch; Mixed Areas andApportioning Method		Page 5, Section II Allocation Principles, clause 14(e), and Page 8 Section III Allocation Criteria, clause 20(b) provide detailed rules on attribution of catches.  A role is provided for the IOTC Secretariat to work with a small working group to determine finer scale spatial attribution of catch history for CPCs.  The Compliance Committee is assigned a role to resolve disagreements on catches in overlapping areas	Consider endorsement of IOTC-2019-TCAC05-R, Para, 37-38
<ul> <li>Foreign Catches in EEZ of IOTC Coastal States</li> <li>Attribution</li> <li>Phased Implementation</li> </ul>	Page 4, Section Main Principles, Clause 8 provides for a calculation of the initial baseline allocation Historical catches taken within the Jurisdiction of Coastal States on the Basis of a reallocation of [10%] of such catches taken by flag States other than the Coastal States to these Coastal States, over a period of [10 years]	Page 5, Section II Allocation Principles, clause 14(e), and Page 8 Section III Allocation Criteria, clause 20(b) chapeau attribute all catches taken within the jurisdiction of a Coastal State, to that Coastal State	

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B. SUPPLEMENTARY/ COMPLEMENTRY ALLOCATION  Allocation Factors:  - Eligibility: Coastal States; Coastal Developing States; Coastal States with catch history	In addition to the Baseline Historical Catch Allocation, Page 4, Clauses 9, 10 and 11 of the EU Proposal provide for a Complementary Allocation.  The Complementary allocation is to be provided to developing States, specifically Least Developed Countries, SIDS and Coastal Developing States, with a view to accommodate their special requirements and special interests	Page 9, clause 21 provides for a supplementary allocation to be shared equally by all Contracting Parties and Cooperating non-Contracting Parties that have catch history for the species being allocated.  Distant Water Fishing New Entrants are excluded from this eligibility (clause 21(a)), and Cooperating non-Contracting Parties shall only receive 50% of that allocated to others (clause 21(b))	(Includes comments of current Chair and those of previous Chair)  Both Proposals suggest an allocation structure that contains consideration of more than catch history  The Coastal States' Proposal includes a specific portion of the TAC to be shared equally by all CPCs (Supplementary Allocation)  Both Proposals include a specific portion of the TAC to be dedicated to Coastal States, in recognition of their status, needs, interests and aspirations
<ul> <li>CS dependence and needs (imports and exports)</li> <li>CS development and social status (WDI, GNI, SIDs)</li> </ul>	Developing States that hold allocations for particular species corresponding to more than [5-10%] are not eligible to this complementary allocation for that species.	A CPC that doesn't have catch history may seek a Supplementary Allocation according to a process set out in clause 28	And Both Proposals suggest a portion of the catch history by non-Coastal States to be transferred to Coastal States in recognition of, and to address, their status, needs, interests and aspirations  The EU Proposal embeds the Developing Coastal State factor for an allocation dedicated to Coastal States to address their status, needs and dependency under their proposed Complementary Allocation, while the Coastal States' proposal has addressed this issue under their Baseline Coastal State Allocation and Correction Factor. While the manner in which the concept is treated in both proposals is different and details vary, there appears to be recognition of, and agreement on, the need to accommodate Developing Coastal States' aspirations and needs in both Proposals.

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- CS interests and aspirations (active fleet; Fleet Development Program/Utilisation Plan)  - Coastal State status in the IOTC Area of Competence & Relative Abundance of stocks in National jurisdictions	To access the Complementary Allocation, Developing CPCs must confirm that their fishing opportunities and efforts are consistent with their Fleet Development Plan submitted under IOTC Resolution 15/11	Under the Baseline Coastal State Allocation in the Coastal States Proposal Page 7, clause 19(a)(i) and (iii), it is proposed that Coastal States to the IOTC that have catch history would be entitled to receive Baseline Coastal State Allocations calculated on the basis of their status as a Coastal States, and the portion of their EEZ in the IOTC area of competence  The EEZ portion criteria may eventually be replaced by one that shares a % of the Baseline Coastal State Allocation based on relative abundance of species being allocated, in individual Coastal States' waters, when such abundance is (can be) estimated by the Scientific Committee (see IOTC-2018-S22-PropK Rev1)	Note: IOTC Resolution 15/11 expired. Members would need to adopt a new resolution on this subject to put the requirement in the EU proposal into effect.  The EU Proposal appears to restrict the complementary allocation to developing States – whether Coastal or not, while the Coastal States' Proposal suggests a Baseline Coastal State Allocations for both developed and developing Coastal States  Whether under the auspices of a baseline allocation or a complementary allocation, TCAC members will need to agree on which group of Coastal States are being targeted in support of accommodating the needs, interests and aspirations, beyond the expectations addressed through an allocation based on historical catches  A request was made to Scientific Committee in IOTC 2018-S22-PropK Rev1. The Commission requested the IOTC Scientific Committee to provide advice as to how an index of relative abundance of each allocated species

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			(as detailed in IOTC-2018-S22-Prop K Rev1) might be constructed, within the area under national jurisdiction of each CPC. Currently the data available is not sufficient to be able to develop the indices of abundance requested.
Corrections for Developing Coastal States	Pages 4-5, Clauses 12-13 provide for Correction Factors, which are to be applied to the sum of allocations to increase such allocations to CPCs where appropriate, to address:	Page 9, clause 22 provides for 2 types of Correction Factors in the form of additional allocation to be provided to a Developing Coastal State:	TCAC05 Report, para 42-43 reflects support for Correction Factors as relevant, but recognizes a need to elaborate on how they would be quantified and operationalized
	<ul> <li>Development and social factors, such as:</li> <li>subsistence, small scale and artisanal fishers dependent on fishing,</li> </ul>	<ul><li>(a) whose total allocation for a species is less than 95% of its average catch for the reference period;</li></ul>	*The EU Proposal is linked and dependent on a scoping study. This Study was conducted by a IOTC consultant in 2019. While indicators were provided, implementation results were
	<ul> <li>the needs of Coastal States whose economies are overwhelmingly</li> </ul>	<ul><li>(b) In recognition of development needs. In this instance, the additional future</li></ul>	inconclusive due to lack of data.
	dependent the exploitation of marine living resources (jobs/GDP), and	fishing opportunities would be facilitated by the gradual reallocation of % of allocation from distant water	The Coastal States' Proposal contains a detailed Developing Coastal State allocation as part of the Baseline Coastal State Allocation, based on a
	<ul> <li>the vulnerability of this dependence on meeting nutritional requirements of their population;</li> </ul>	fishing CPCs whose total allocation for that species exceeds 4% of the GTAC	combination of internationally recognized indicators provided by: - the UN Department of Economic and Social
		The reallocation would start 1 year after	Affairs;
	- Fishery-related issues and trade factors, such	the adoption of the Allocation Regime and be completed within 5 years, with	- OECD - UNDP; and
	as - Real fishing interests evidenced by	20% of the reallocation to occur	- World Bank
	fishing patters, practices and existence	annually during this period. Eligibility	

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	of an active domestic fleet or a Fishery Development Plan under implementation;  - The weight of imports of raw tuna products for transformation on the State's economy; and  - % of GDP depends on exports of products from the exploitation of marine living resources	and distribution details are to be developed by the TCAC following the adoption of the Allocation Regime.	Including a simulation in Appendix I of their Proposal.  Members may wish to consider the internationally accepted GNI (World Bank) indicator used by the IOTC in its Financial Regulations.  It is not clear how the Coastal States' second proposed correction factor in this section related to "development needs" differs from the development factors laid out in their Baseline Coastal State Allocation Clarification needed: The EU proposal appears to require that CPCs hold an initial Baseline Allocation (hence catch history) to be entitled to a Complementary Allocation and Correction Factor, however, this is not clear from the wording of the proposal.
C. OTHER ALLOCATION FACTORS  - Contributions to conservation and management of stocks and provision of accurate data, if not addressed as eligibility criteria	None provided	None provided	None of these factors were included in the proposals currently on the table, though the EU proposal did include, in a previous iteration, consideration of the contributions by CPCs to the conservation and management of IOTC stocks.  These are suggested by the Chair, for consideration by TCAC Members, recognizing that these are often considered in allocation regime discussions in RFMOs, though not all are retained.

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- CPC Contribution to scientific research			
- Setting aside an allocation for science survey purpose			Setting aside a % of the GTAC addresses the sustainability of GTAC
Theme 5: ADJUSTMENTS			
A. OVERCATCH & NON- COMPLIANCE ADJUSTMENTS	Page 3, Section Main Principles, clause 5	Page 10, Section III Allocation Criteria, Clause 25:	Consider endorsement of IOTC-2019-TCAC05-R, para 30-31, and Appendix 5
- Adjustments for non-compliance	Lose eligibility if compliance score of less than 60% over 2 consecutive years without indication of real progress (10% improved complaince) Page 5, clause 15, specifies that such losses are temporary and that the allocation may be reacquired as soon as the conditions that led to the loss have ceased to exist	Deduction Ratios1:2:1; or 1:5:1 if deferral requested; and 2:1 for subsequent consecutive over-catch with no deferral	These two proposals treat non-compliance differently. The EU Proposal affects eligibility to the entire allocation, whereas the Coastal States' Proposal proposes to proportionally impact the amount of allocation to be received in a given year.
- Work that the Commission may wish to refer to the Compliance Committee	Refers to mechanism to be developed by the IOTC Compliance Committee	Refers to mechanism to be developed by the IOTC Secretariat	Chair suggests Members consider making a specific recommendation from TCAC to the Commission to assign work to the Compliance Committee/Secretariat on developing a mechanism for this purpose

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B. ADJUSTMENTS FOR STOCK DECLINES  - Phased Implementation  - Threshold for Developing	Page 4, clause 7 provides for a gradual adjustment over a period of [5-10] years to adjust to reductions in allocations in excess of [10%]	Page 11, clause 27 in the Implementation Section provides for a proportional reduction [1/4-1/3] in allocation for Developing Coastal States and SIDS, when a GTAC decreases from previous allocation periods	Would a gradual implementation of an allocation reduction due to stock declines as proposed by the EU not be better suited for Harvest Control Rules implementing a precautionary approach for the given stock?
Coastal States			
Theme 6: WEIGHTING  Consider whether weighting is necessary or feasible at this time  % of TAC to be attributed to each component of the allocation components	Page 3, Main Principles Section, Clause 3 provides for the GTAC proportions for allocation criteria in the EU proposal:  - Initial Baseline allocation: 80% - Complementary allocation: 12% - New Entrants: 1% - Correction Factors: 7%  Page 6, clause 19 contains a commitment to reaching agreement on a weighting scheme for	Weighting percentages are spread out in the Coastal States proposal. Pages 10-11, Section IV, clause 26 provide for GTAC Proportions for allocation criteria. Pages Page7, clause 19 provides more details on the % weight to be attributed to each factor and subcomponent of the Baseline allocation for Coastal States:  -Baseline allocations:80%  - Baseline Coastal State: 20%  - Baseline historical catch: 65%	In both proposals, weighting is accomplished by assigning notional [bracketed] percentages of the Global Total Allowable Catch for a given species to each allocation criteria/component, and to each factor within each allocation component.  A question arises as to whether it is necessary or useful to consider these weighting % at this time, or whether consideration of this should wait until after the allocation structure, its components and the factors are agreed upon?
	correction factors within 2 years of adoption of the Allocation Regime	-Supplementary allocation: 5%  -Correction factor allocation: 15%, increasing over time  - CFI: 15%  - CF2: this would not be coming from the GTAC, but instead from a reallocation from DWF CPCs, increased over time	The Chair suggests that Members consider the timing of developing and agreeing to this: whether this needs to be fleshed out now or whether it can be done in a second phase to the work of the TCAC, after the allocation structure has been agreed to Although this may make things more complex, TCAC members may wish to consider whether weighting could be different by species

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Theme 7: IMPLEMENTATION - Phased implementation			It may be challenging to implement the Allocation Regime on all IOTC stocks at once. Rather than delay the implementation of the regime, the Commission could consider a phased implementation by prioritizing the stocks to which it will apply first. Or, alternatively, it could establish criteria for creating this priority list. TCAC Members could make recommendations on this to the Commission
<ul> <li>Role of Science         Committee, Compliance         Committee, the         Secretariat, other IOTC         bodies</li> <li>Work for assignment to         other IOTC body</li> </ul>		Process for establishing Historical Catch  Page 6, section II Allocation Principles, clause 14(e): Estimates by the Secretariat, approved by the Scientific Committee and endorsed by the Commission  Page 11, clause 27 proposes that the Secretariat establish an administrative process for developing catch reports for the purpose of establishing baseline historical catch, supplementary allocation and baseline coastal state allocations	The Chair suggests that it would be useful to identify the roles of various bodies of the IOTC in the implementation of the Allocation regime in the body of the Allocation Regime, and ensure that recommendations are made by the TCAC to the Commission for assigning the necessary work to these bodies
A. CATCH RECONCILIATION MECHANISM  General views on linkages to the Allocation Regime	Page 3, Section Main Principles, clause 5 Refers to the Compliance Committee to develop a mechanism for addressing the implications of non-compliance on allocations	Page 10, clause 25, proposes that the Secretariat propose a mechanism to reconcile reported catch against CPC allocations and submit this for the Commission's recommendation	Most RFMOs who have put in place allocations have established a catch reconciliation regime, to enable the relevant Commission bodies and its members to review catch reports and proposed allocations, adjust these based on factual

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Work that the Commission may wish to consider assigning to the Compliance Committee			representations by Members and the scientific bodies, and any other adjustments required by the regime, including for compliance, unused allocations and transfer requests.
Committee			TCAC members may wish to consider proposing such a mechanism in their proposed Allocation Regime, that could involve more than one committee of the IOTC, and make recommendations to the Commission on roles for the appropriate IOTC bodies
B. TRANSFERABILITY OF ALLOCATIONS	Page 6, Clause 20:  No transfers unless authorized by Commission	Page 6, Allocation Principles Section, Clause 14(g) and Page 10, clause 24:	Common ground reached at TCAC04 (para 17(iii)), that some provision on transferability should be contained in the final resolution and the process
- Whether to allow transfers	Access agreements with Coastal States exempted	Allowed	should be transparent.
of allocations	from this process requirement	Notification requirement to the Secretariat,	
- Terms and Conditions		which must circulate to members CNCPs not eligible	Both proposals support allocation transfers, though the approval/notification requirements differ. TCAC members may wish to consider the operational needs related to transfers and the most appropriate timeframe for decision-making by the IOTC on these matters.
C. TERM OF ALLOCATIONS	Page 5, clause 15	Page 4, Definitions Section, Clause 1, and Page	If the term of the GTAC and allocations are based
	Final allocation valid for 5 years	11, Implementation Section V, Clause 29	on a stock assessment cycle as proposed by the
5 years or terms aligned	Adjustments made for non-compliance or not		Coastal States' Proposal, TCAC Members should
with stock assessments for each stock	reporting nominal catch are temporary	Pariod sat by spacios aligned with stack	consider recommending to the Commission and the Scientific Committee a rotational stock
euch Stock	Clause 17	Period set by species, aligned with stock assessment and GTAC	assessment calendar, which would avoid the
	Final allocation is not a precedent for future	Default: 1 calendar year	Commission having to address setting GTACs for
	allocations decisions or revisions.		

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			all stocks at the same annual meeting. Other RFMOs have implemented this.
D. AVAILABILITY OF DATA AND INFORMATION  - Data and Information requirements for proposals and current availability.  - If not currently available, consider feasibility, costs, and phased implementation			While the issue of data availability for establishing TACs has been discussed in detail during previous TCAC meetings, and referred to the Commission and its committees, the TCAC may wish to consider this issue in the context of a phased implementation of the Allocation Regime (see Theme 8), starting on the basis of stocks for which data is available  Recommendations to the Commission from the TCAC could include addressing data gaps, as appropriate, so that additional stocks may be implemented under the Allocation Regime
Theme 8: TRANSITION		Nothing on this topic	Consider how to move from the current state of play to a Commission with an allocation regime.
<ul> <li>Need to ensure viable,</li> <li>sustainable and manageable</li> <li>regime</li> <li>Need to mitigate</li> <li>destabilizing effects,</li> <li>including on economies,</li> <li>jobs, markets and market</li> <li>access, etc.</li> </ul>			It may be advisable to put in place an implementation plan to transition from the current state to the new regime, and ensure that the first set of allocations is subject to thorough review before their full implementation.
- Phased transfer from DWFNs to Coastal States, as	Pages 3-4, clauses 7 and 8, and Page 5, clause 16 provide for transitional implementation of		Factor in time required to:

Themes	EU Proposal <sup>i</sup>	Coastal States Proposal <sup>ii</sup>	Chair's Comments <sup>iii</sup> and Suggestions (Includes comments of current Chair and those of previous Chair)
a transition to attributing foreign catch to Coastal States' for historical catch allocations	allocation setting and adjustments, to ensure stability of the sector		<ul> <li>put in place the tools (data sets, draft allocation tables, etc)</li> <li>the governance (subcommittees) to operationalize the regime</li> <li>review process for Members to review the first set of Allocation tables prior to officially putting in place the regime</li> <li>In addition to considering gradual steps for the first application of the Allocation Regime, as suggested earlier in this Table, Members may wish to consider a phased approach for the full implementation of the Allocation Regime, once adopted. A species-by-species approach may provide for an easier transition, especially if data and information is lacking to fully implement the regime for certain stocks.</li> </ul>
Theme 9:			
<ul> <li>FINAL CLAUSES</li> <li>Duration of Allocation Regime</li> <li>Review and Amendments</li> </ul>	Nothing provided	Page 11, clause 30 provides for a 5 year term for the Allocation Regime, starting after it is adopted, and a review and revisions brought to incorporate latest scientific information on areas including species biological distribution and spawning grounds as well as biological-ecological significance provided in the baseline coastal state allocation provision	Recognizing that the Allocation Regime text would not stand on its own, but rather be read in conjunction with the overarching IOTC Agreement and other relevant instruments, TCAC members may nevertheless wish to include specific final clauses regarding the status of the regime  Specifically, TCAC members may wish to set a term for reviewing the Allocation regime, balancing the need for stability and recognizing the time it is taking to develop this first iteration

## August 2020 Prepared for TCAC06

Themes	EU Proposal <sup>i</sup>	Coastal States Proposalii	Chair's Comments <sup>iii</sup> and Suggestions (Includes comments of current Chair and those of previous Chair)
<ul> <li>Safeguards for legal positions regarding ongoing disputes</li> <li>Others</li> </ul>			It may also be possible to address concerns expressed in TCAC meetings with respect to boundary disputes and other international disputes, by safeguarding members' legal positions in this regard

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>i</sup>IOTC-2019-S23-PropM[E]

<sup>&</sup>quot;IOTC-2020-TCAC06-PropA[E]

iii Includes comments of current Chair, and those of previous Chair of TCAC from his Three Column Document submitted to the Commission after TCAC05 in April 2019, after completion of his work as Chair.