

COMISION INTERAMERICANA DEL ATUN TROPICAL INTER-AMERICAN TROPICAL TUNA COMMISSION

8604 La Jolla Shores Drive, La Jolla CA 92037-1508, USA – www.iattc.org
Tel: (858) 546-7100 – Fax: (858) 546-7133 – Director: Guillermo Compeán

22 July 2008
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To: Workshop Participants



From: Guillermo Compeán, Director

Re: Right-Based Management and Buybacks in International Tuna Fisheries

On behalf of the Chair, I am sending the attached final Workshop Report, together with two summaries that are suitable for press releases and the agreed note about dissemination of the report. As we discussed, in addition to the agreed dissemination responsibilities, we are all free to disseminate the report and/or the news releases as widely as possible.



REPORT OF A
WORKSHOP ON RIGHTS-BASED
MANAGEMENT AND BUYBACKS IN
INTERNATIONAL TUNA
FISHERIES



La Jolla, CA, USA, 5-9 May 2008

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OPENING

The meeting was opened by the Chair, Meryl Williams. She introduced Guillermo Compéan, the Director of the Inter-American Tropical Commission (IATTC), the institution hosting the Workshop, who welcomed participants to the meeting.

The financial support provided for the meeting by NOAA Fisheries of the United States was acknowledged.

INTRODUCTION and ARRANGEMENTS

The participants of the Workshop introduced themselves, indicating their interest in the issues outlined in the prospectus for the Workshop (Appendix I). Appendix II gives the list of participants.

The provisional Agenda was adopted without any change (Appendix III).

The Chair noted that two background papers had been distributed (Appendix IV) and as well as presentations of those, three presentations would be made as part of Agenda item 3. The background papers and two information papers and the PowerPoint presentations

have been placed on the IATTC website at <http://www.iattc.org/IATTC-Other-Meetings-Buyback-May2008ENG.htm> .

The Chair nominated participants to introduce each of the subjects to be discussed under Agenda items 4 and 5, and the report of the summary of the discussion of the workshop would be discussed under agenda item 7, but that the final editing and approval would be carried out by correspondence. The Summary of Discussions is attached as Annex V.

PRESENTATION OF THE BACKGROUND PAPERS and OTHER MATERIAL

Kieran Kelleher outlined a possible approach for a rights-based management system for eastern Pacific tuna fisheries and explained the approach the World Bank would have to any buyback funding, which of necessity would be commercially based.

Robin Allen presented the first background paper, *“Workshop on Rights-based Management and Buybacks in International Tuna Fisheries.”*

Peter Miyake made a presentation on the recent large-scale tuna longline vessel buybacks carried out for vessels from Japan, Taiwan and other Japanese built vessels, which were considered by the organization for the Promotion of Responsible Tuna Fisheries (OPRT) to be IUU vessels.

Dale Squires made a presentation on the purposes and practicalities of vessel buy-back programs.

Andrew Serdy presented the second background paper, *“International Fisheries Law and the Transferability of Quota: Principles and Precedents.”*

RIGHTS BASED MANAGEMENT METHODS

James Joseph introduced the discussion on rights based management methods;

- a. Robin Allen introduced the discussion on limited entry,
- b. Quentin Grafton introduced the discussion on individual transferable quotas, and
- c. Dale Squires introduced the discussion on the buyback of vessels or fishing rights.
- d. Beth DeSombre introduced ideas on trade restriction instruments
- e. Gary Libecap introduced research conclusions on common property and collective options.

MECHANICS OF MONITORING, CONTROL AND SURVEILLANCE

Ray Clark introduced the discussion on the mechanics of monitoring, control, and surveillance that were needed for rights based fisheries management.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR FURTHER WORK

The workshop identified the opportunities for future work;

- Preparation of a model of a rights-based management system, which would be used as a case study for a future workshop with a focus on participation by

representatives of the industry.

- Development of an economic case for a buyback and implementation of a rights-based management system
- Development of a political feasibility analysis for rights-based fisheries management taking account of the interests of all stakeholders
- Dissemination of Short Report that can be used to promote the ideas of rights-based management of tuna fisheries.

MEETING REPORT

The Workshop considered an outline of the summary of discussions and agreed on its general content, with the draft summary to be agreed by correspondence. The Administrative sections of the Report will be drafted by Robin Allen.

CLOSE OF WORKSHOP

The workshop was closed at 5pm on Thursday 8 May.

APPENDIX I Workshop prospectus



BRIEF

WORKSHOP ON RIGHTS-BASED MANAGEMENT AND BUYBACKS IN INTERNATIONAL TUNA FISHERIES



HIGH SEAS TENURE BUILDING AN INTERNATIONAL FISHING RIGHTS REGIME

BACKGROUND

International tuna fisheries. Tunas, which move between the high seas and the Exclusive Economic Zones, are classified as highly-migratory species and under the Law of the Sea their management requires international cooperation. Tuna fleets move between oceans seeking out and often depleting tuna stocks when the fleet capacity exceeds the sustainable yield of the stocks. The management of the tuna stocks is organized through various international fishery commissions, for example, the Inter American Tropical Tuna Commission ([IATTC](#)) which has a mandate over the area referred to as the eastern Pacific Ocean (see map below).

International management regimes. International tuna management regimes tend to be weak, frequently relying on compromise management resolutions, which may subject to 'opt-out' provisions by dissenting member countries. Increasingly trade measures are used to back up management



decision. A major constraint is the lack of clarity on the rights over these internationally-shared fish stocks. Disputes with regard to allocation catches and disagreement over the health of the fish stocks is often compounded by the diverse interests of the region's coastal states, the interests of the fishing states from outside the region and the fishing activities of states, which are non-member of the commissions.

Rights-based management approaches. Fisheries with effectively designed and managed property rights regimes, where clear tenure and responsibilities are assigned, tend to generate more wealth and benefits and at a lower cost in terms of both harvesting and conservation and management. The establishment of such rights regimes in an

international fishery poses a range of particularly difficult conceptual, political, legal and economic challenges.


OBJECTIVE

The objective of the workshop is to address the challenge of creating an international rights-based regime for the purse seine fishery operating in the eastern Pacific Ocean.

The workshop is seen merely as a first step in addressing these issues. The workshop will sow the seeds of an idea which may take a decade to germinate. Nevertheless sustainability of ocean-wide fisheries requires regime changes and the process to transform the principles and practices of international ocean management need to be set in motion. It is envisaged that this process could develop a regional instrument with an embedded regional financing arrangement brokered by the World Bank.

THE WORKSHOP AND THE ROLE OF THE BANK

The workshop is essentially a ‘brainstorming’ session bringing together key industry players and policy makers from the coastal state members of the Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and the United States. The workshop will be backed by the scientific advice from the IATTC and other agencies such as FAO and NOAA/ NMFS.



Role of the Bank.

The World Bank’s PROFISH partnership will provide financial support for the workshop. However the primary Bank input required at this stage is intellectual. The intellectual task is to design an instrument which will move the common property regime to a rights based regime, preferably with internationally tradable rights and which may contain some or all of the following characteristics:

- (a) The rights would be to fishing capacity (e.g. numbers of vessels) or fish (i.e. a proportion of a catch determined to be sustainable by the Commission based on the best available scientific advice).
- (b) The instrument would be consistent with the Law of the Sea and other relevant international instruments and conventions, including those pertaining to protected species
- (c) The instrument would be enforceable at national and international levels
- (d) It would accommodate winners and losers with regard to the initial allocation of resources and possibly compensate for subsequent changes in allocation keys resulting from natural causes, e.g. El Nino events, or management measures.

- (e) It would allow for international trade in the rights while maintaining the necessary political balances and equity including post harvest equity considerations (e.g. benefits from processing or vessel construction).
- (f) It would provide for financing the science and control (e.g. independent monitoring of catches) required to sustain the fishery as a profitable international industry.
- (g) It would provide mechanisms and rules to address subsidies and / or trade inequities among the coastal states involved and trade issues emerging from environmental issues (e.g. dolphin mortality)
- (h) It would, if necessary, finance a buyout of excess fleet capacity
- (i) It would move the fishery towards certification as a sustainable source of tuna supply

THE FISHERY


Why this fishery? The Eastern Pacific Ocean purse seine fishery is chosen because there are limited numbers of 'free riders', it has a well-established commission. Fishing capacity and stocks are at manageable levels. However, it is feared that as stocks recover, fishing capacity will increase.

Catch and fleet. Recent tuna catches are in the approximately 550,000 tonnes per year. The catch value is in the order of \$750 million/ year. In 2007 the purse seine fleet (237 vessels) was dominated by Ecuadorian (86) and Mexican (65) flag vessels. Purse seine vessels are highly sophisticated, with a value in the order of \$20 million each, or more depending on the vessel's age. Many carry helicopters on board. There are strong links between the harvesting sub-sector (fleet) and the processors (e.g. canneries), including vertical integration and contract fishing.



This fishery occurs both within and outside the 200-mile EEZs and the tuna resources are shared both by the coastal states and 'distant water fishing nations' - e.g. Japan. Almost all the catch is used for canning purposes and most canneries are located in (or are progressively moving to) the low labor cost countries in the region. The highly labor intensive tuna canning and processing plants have moved from developed to developing countries such as Ecuador and Thailand. Relatively higher costs in island economies, such as Seychelles and Maldives, have also placed pressure on their tuna processing industries.

The [Inter American Tropical Tuna Commission](#) is charged with the management of this fishery (map shows area of jurisdiction). Coastal member states are: Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador,



France, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and the United States. Distant water members are: Vanuatu, Venezuela, Japan, Republic of Korea and Spain.

ISSUES

Political. The political issues include disputes over international maritime boundaries; trade and environment issues such as the well-know tuna-dolphin dispute between the US and Mexico. Maintenance of a ‘level playing field’ among members is a political challenge as the benefits accruing to countries without a processing (e.g. canning) industry are likely to be considerably less than countries with a major tuna processing industry. At a national level, the allocation of tuna resources between the fleets is politically sensitive, e.g. between smaller inshore vessels and the offshore industrial purse seine fleet (some of which may fly foreign flags).

Legal. The legal issues relevant to that fishery are at both an international level and national level. At the international level, although the Law of the Sea Convention is recognized as reflecting the applicable rules of *international* law and many provisions of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement¹ may also be considered as the expression of these rules, a number of countries are still not Parties to these instruments (e.g. USA in the case of the former, most of the members of the IATTC and others in the case of the latter). Coherence and equivalence between regulatory regimes to create a level playing field at the international level also requires considerable effort and international goodwill. At national level allocation (e.g. allocation between purse seine and longline fleets) and enforcement of an internationally agreed regime pose challenges.

Financial. Not all IATTC member countries have significant tuna industries and the scale of their benefits from the industry may not be at parity with their contribution in terms of the tuna stocks in their economic zones (EEZs). Further, seasonal restrictions or other management measures may impact disproportionately on different IATTC members. Consequently some arrangements for compensation may be required if equitable and durable international arrangements are to be established. Similarly, at national level, there may be winners and losers and a financial package may be required to offset hardship or compensate for ‘environmental services’.


Economic. An arms length evaluation of the benefits accruing to different countries would be required as a basis for any negotiation. This evaluation would also need to model, or make provision for gains and losses to the different actors as a result of change.

Environmental. Environmental issues include the tuna dolphin issue which has been the source of a major trade and environment dispute culminating in a WTO ruling. Certification of the fishery as sustainable source of supply is an emerging challenge, while high levels of exploitation of some tuna species in the management area is a further cause of concern.

¹ The Agreement contains principles and rules related to the international management of highly migratory stocks such as tunas.

Change management. Categories of change drivers could be envisaged – those due to tuna management measures (such as restrictions on fishing), climate change, or aberrant markets – changes attributable to certain drivers could be eligible for compensation.

Free riders. These are vessels or flag states (whether IATTC members or not) which do not apply and enforce the internationally agreed management measures. The free riders benefit from reduced fishing effort by the compliant vessels and states, do not contribute to the costs of research and functioning of the Commission and may fail to report on their catches, which can undermine the statistical basis of the management science.



PARTNERS

IATTC. The [Inter American Tropical Tuna Commission](#), established by international convention in 1950, is responsible for the conservation and management of fisheries for tunas and other species taken by tuna-fishing vessels in the eastern Pacific Ocean. Each member country of the IATTC is represented by up to four Commissioners, appointed by the respective government. The IATTC also has significant responsibilities for the implementation of the International Dolphin Conservation Program (IDCP), and provides the Secretariat for that program.

Private sector. The tuna industry is owned and operated by the private sector – vessel operators, processors and traders and these are essential participants in the workshop. Various private sector organizations are expected to actively collaborate.

FAO. Collaboration and in-kind support from FAO is expected through the PROFISH partnership.

NOAA/ NMFS. Collaboration and in-kind support from NOAA National Marine Fisheries Service is expected either through the PROFISH partnership or directly through its staff working on tuna management issues.



Workshop inputs from the Bank. The Bank will help finance preparation of background papers and cover some of the workshop costs through a budget is for \$60k sourced from the PROFISH DGF Grant and administered by IUCN. Inputs of Bank staff time, particularly from the LAC Region and LEG are envisaged in the form of two concept notes on:

- the regional financial instrument which could be envisaged and
- the legal dimensions of the international financial and enforcement arrangements

Proposed workshop location and dates. The proposed location is the [Institute of Americas](#) on the campus of the University of California, San Diego in La Jolla. The IOA has a twenty-five year history as a promoter of informed discussion and debate about public policies in the American hemisphere. At conferences organized throughout Latin America and the United States, government officials, private sector executives and representatives of non-governmental organizations exchange views on pressing contemporary economic and social issues. In-kind support is envisaged from the IOA. The proposed workshop would be planned for April 2008.




FIGURE A-2a. Average annual distributions of the purse-seine catches of skipjack, by set type, 1990-2004. The sizes of the circles are proportional to the amounts of skipjack caught in those 5° by 5° areas.

FIGURA A-2a. Distribución media anual de las capturas cerqueras de barrilete, por tipo de lance, 1990-2004. El tamaño de cada círculo es proporcional a la cantidad de barrilete capturado en la cuadrícula de 5° x 5° correspondiente

Source: IATTC

APPENDIX II List of participants

Dr. Meryl Williams

Scylla@myjaring.net

Chairman

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Allen, Robin

P.O. Box 5159

Springlands

Blenheim 7241, New Zealand

Rjallen98@ihug.co.nz

Hannesson, Rognvaldur

Department of Economics

Norges Handelshøyskole

Helleveien 30

NO-5045 Bergen, Norway

rognvaldur.hannesson@nhh.no

Alsina, Hugo

Asesor de Asuntos Internacionales

MAGA-UNIPESCA

4a Av. 22-91, zona 14

Residencias San Sur, Apto. # 2

Ciudad de Guatemala 01014

Hugo@alsina-et-al.org

Ishimura, Gaku

Mathematical Biology Section

National Research Institute of Far Seas

Fisheries

5-7-1 Orido, Shimizu-ku Shizuoka

424-8633 Japan

gakugaku@aol.com

Arbuckle, Michael

Agriculture and Rural Department

The World Bank

818 H. Sr. NW

Washington DC 20433

marbuckle@worldbank.org

Jeon, Yongil

10820 Corte de Marin

San Diego, Ca 92130

yjeon@skku.edu

Chin-Hwa, Jenny Sun

Institute of Applied Economics

National Taiwan Ocean University

2 Pei-Ning Road

Keelung, Taiwan 20224

Republic of China

jennysun@ucsd.edu

Joseph, James

2790 Palomino Circle

La Jolla, CA 92037

jjoseph@san.rr.com

Clarke, Raymond

NOAA Fisheries, Pacific Island Regional Office

1601 Kapiolani Blvd. Suite 1110

Honolulu, Hawaii 96814

Raymond.clarke@noaa.gov

Kelleher, Kieran

Agriculture and Rural Department

The World Bank

818 H. Sr. NW

Washington DC 20433

kkelleher@worldbank.org

Compeán, Guillermo

Director
 Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
 8604 La Jolla Shores Drive
 La Jolla, Ca 92037
gcompean@iattc.org

Curto, Renato

President
 Tri-Marine International
 222 West Sixth Street, Suite 900
 San Pedro, Ca 90731
rcurto@trimarinegroup.com

DeSombre, Elizabeth

Department of Political Science
 Wellesley Collage
 106 Central Street
 Wellesley, MA 02481
edesombr@wellsley.edu

Flournoy, Peter

General Counsel
 American Fishermen's Research Foundation
 740 North Harbor Drive
 San Diego, Ca 92101-5806
phf@pacificbell.net

Fox, William

Director
 World Wildlife Fund
 Marine Fisheries Program
 P.O. Box 60633
 San Diego Ca 92106
bill.fox@wwfus.org

Grafton, Quentin

J.G. Crawford Building Building #13
 Crawford School of Economics and Government
 The Australian National University
 Canberra ACT 0200
 Australia
Quentin.grafton@anu.edu.au

Knowles, Travis

Department of Political Science
 Social Sciences Building 301
 9500 Gilman Drive 521
 La Jolla, Ca 92093
tknowles@ucsr.edu

Krampe, Paul

Executive Director
 American Tuna Boat Association
 2535 Kettner Blvd. Suite 3c1a
 San Diego, Ca 92101
krampepaul@aol.com

Lent, Rebecca

Office of International Affairs
 National Marine Fisheries Service
 1315 East-West Highway, Room 12659
 Silver Spring, Maryland 20910
Rebecca.lent@noaa.gov

Libecap, Gary

Donald Bren School of Environmental
 Science and Management
 University of California Santa Barbara
 Santa Barbara, Ca 93106
GlibecapA@bren.ucsb.edu

McGowan, Michael

Vice President
 Bumble Bee Seafoods, Inc.
 9655 Granite Ridge Road
 Suite 100
 San Diego, CA 92123
mcgowanm@bumblebee.com

Miyake, Peter

Scientific Advisor
 Japan Tuna Fisheries Co-operative Assoc.
 3-3-4 Shimorenjaku Mitaka-shi
 Tokyo 181-0013, Japan
p.m.miyake@gamma.oc-n.net.jp

Groves, Theodore
Department of Economics 0508
University of California San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, Ca 92093-0508
tgroves@ucsd.edu

Pereira, Juan A
OPAGAC
C/Ayala 54
Madrid, Spain 28009
opagac@aattold.es

Sanchez, Andres
Director of Resourcing
Bumblebee
P.O. Box 85362
San Diego, Ca 92186
Andres.sanchez@bumblebee.com

Serdy, Andrew
Institute of Maritime Law
School of Law
University of Southampton
Highfield, Southampton, S017 1BJ
United Kingdom
A.L.Serdy@soton.ac.uk

Squire, Dale
Southwest Fisheries Science Center
National Marine Fisheries Service
8604 La Jolla Shores Drive
La Jolla, Ca 92037
dsquires@ucsd.edu

APPENDIX III

Agenda

Workshop on Rights-based Management and Buybacks in International Tuna Fisheries

**University of California at San Diego, La Jolla, California
May 5-9 2008**

2. Welcome
3. Arrangements and Introduction of participants
4. Presentation of the background paper
5. Rights based management methods
 - a. Limited entry
 - b. Individual transferable quotas
 - c. Buyback of vessels or fishing rights
6. Mechanics of management, monitoring, control and surveillance
7. Considerations for further work
8. Meeting report
9. Close of Workshop

APPENDIX IV Background papers

[*Workshop on Rights-based Management and Buybacks in International Tuna Fisheries*](#) by Robin Allen, James Joseph, and Dale Squires

[*International Fisheries Law and the Transferability of Quota: Principles and Precedents*](#) by Andrew Serdy.

APPENDIX V Summary of discussion

NEW INTERNATIONAL TUNA MANAGEMENT COULD BRING BIG BENEFITS

SUMMARY REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON RIGHTS-BASED MANAGEMENT AND BUYBACKS IN INTERNATIONAL TUNA FISHERIES

Sponsored by IATTC and World Bank, IATTC, La Jolla, USA, 5-9 May 2008

The objective of the workshop was to address the challenges of creating international rights-based management regimes for tuna fisheries. The participants were selected to ensure that there was expertise in fisheries economics, political science, and international oceans law, and a wide range of experience in the fishing industry, government, and regional fisheries management organizations. The conclusions of the workshop represent the consensus views of the attendees and not the formal position or commitment of any participants or their companies or institutes.

Tuna fishing is a global industry, its fleets operate across different ocean jurisdictions, the product supplies global markets and its management requires global solutions. Because all tuna stocks in waters under national jurisdictions and the high seas are already being exploited, there are no more open frontiers for tuna fishing and the time is ripe for strong, coordinated international management.

The Workshop participants concluded that if rights-based fisheries management is done correctly in international tuna fisheries, much greater value can be created and sustained. However, the success of this new management regime will rest on governments, regional tuna management organizations and the industry reaching agreement on how to allocate the rights.

1. WHY RIGHTS-BASED MANAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TUNA FISHERIES?

Tuna stocks are shared across international boundaries; they migrate across national jurisdictions and high seas. Currently, international cooperation takes place under the auspices of five tuna regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs). In 2007, the tuna RFMOs met in Kobe, Japan to share experiences. In the future, greater coordinated management across RFMOs will be required because changes in management in one organization have repercussions for fisheries managed by other organizations. Indeed, in the Pacific Ocean, the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) and the Western Central Pacific Fishery Commission (WCPFC) management areas overlap in part. In particular, management must be implemented by the relevant RFMO and applied throughout the range of the stocks.

The primary objective of tuna management is the restoration of overfished tuna stocks and the maintenance of sustainability of all tuna stocks at optimal levels. Optimal levels can take account of economic efficiency and increasing the benefits derived from the fishery, food security, an optimal level of employment in the fleet and in tuna canneries, biodiversity conservation, and ecosystem services.

To achieve these objectives, the incentives of fishers and management authorities need to be aligned. Under current management regimes, the incentives of fishers and management authorities often conflict, which inhibits the effectiveness of management and decreases the value of tuna fisheries. Current management measures are inadequate for many species, especially bluefin, albacore, yellowfin, and bigeye. In all oceans there is excess fleet capacity. Rights to fish are weakly defined or non-existent. Consequently, fishers seek to increase fleet capacity in the competition for fish which undercuts the effectiveness of management and erodes the value of the fishery.

Rights-based management (sometimes referred to as incentive-based management) offers the best opportunity for aligning public and private incentives for fisheries conservation because it harnesses fishers' motivations to achieve management objectives by clearly defining and allocating rights and responsibilities. Because fishers derive benefits from increasing the value of the fishery, they comply voluntarily with management measures rather than work to evade them. Successful rights-based management is supported by high quality research, effective enforcement and well-functioning administration. The history of fisheries management reveals a number of positive examples. Iceland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Namibia, and the United States have all adopted some form of rights-based management for certain fisheries. Internationally, the North Pacific Fur Seal treaty succeeded in restoring the sustainability of fur seal populations by allocating sealing rights to countries; in tuna fisheries the Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP) succeeded in minimizing dolphin mortality from tuna fishing in the Eastern Pacific Ocean by allocating dolphin mortality limits directly to individual vessels.

2. CONSTRAINTS TO RIGHTS-BASED FISHERIES MANAGEMENT AND A GUIDE TO MOVING FORWARD

Despite the promise of greater benefits, the transition to rights-based fisheries management in tuna faces huge challenges. The resource, fishing fleets and the management authorities are diverse and international. How can the diverse interests of the fleet owners and management authorities be aligned throughout the range of the resource? Further, sunk investments, change and the attendant uncertainty in outcomes create a natural resistance and preference for the *status quo*.

Constraints to rights-based tuna management

Harmonizing management across ocean jurisdictions: International tuna management faces the challenge of harmonizing management measures throughout the distribution of the fisheries resources and thus across waters under national jurisdiction and on the high

seas. The application of management measures in one area could cause an undesirable shift of fishing effort to other areas that do not apply similar measures. Regional and national management authorities will have to agree to harmonize their actions and work with the emerging interpretations and powers of international oceans law.

Country aspirations differ: Differing country aspirations and objectives can hinder attaining the greatest benefits from the fisheries. Countries will expect to retain ownership of fundamental rights and determine their own specific objectives in exercising their rights. Coastal countries will differ from distant water fishing countries in their interests, expectations and the trade-offs they are prepared to make. For example, some coastal developing countries have more interest in attracting tuna canneries for employment than in the employment offered on fishing vessels. Paradoxically however, the greatest benefits of a rights-based management scheme are obtained when the rights are well specified and can be freely traded between nations. Consequently there is an inherent tension between a government's wish to retain control of resources and to use a rights-based system to drive improved management. In reaching a balance a government may therefore prefer to encumber rights to achieve some other policy objectives. For example a government may prevent the transfer of some rights to fish to vessels not flying its flag. Such encumbrances can be accommodated within a rights-based system, but at the cost of economic returns.

Complex multiple fisheries on multi-species stocks: The international tuna fisheries in each region use several gear types and fishing methods on many target species, generate bycatch of many different species, and are subject to ever-changing ocean ecosystems. Throughout the geographic area of the fishery and beyond, thus, the fishery components are interrelated and are affected by changes in fishing fleets, fish markets and the economy. A new rights-based management system will need to deal with the current distribution of different types of fishing gear, e.g., longline, purse seine and many small scale gear types, and methods, e.g., purse seine fishing on FADs, unassociated schools, and on schools associated with dolphins, and changes in this distribution over time.

Transferability: Transferability of use rights is highly desirable and indeed necessary at some levels, such as between private sector rights holders. However, other forms of transferability of rights, such as between different gears or fishing methods, must be addressed carefully to determine the appropriate equivalence in terms of the broader set of ecosystem impacts of the fishery (e.g., target stock, incidental catch, bycatch of protected species, and habitat impacts).

The challenges of reducing fishing capacity and limiting entrants: With excess capacity in a fishery, management authorities will be pressured to satisfy the immediate demands of the fleet and would be more likely to set unsafe catch limits or create excessive fishing rights. To remove this constraint to a successful rights-based management system, a necessary but not sufficient step is to reduce fishing capacity, typically by limiting entry and vessel buybacks. Capacity reductions and other input controls, e.g., effort controls such as days fished, alone are unlikely to deliver resource sustainability and profitability. Experience shows that such reductions can be evaded immediately through using more

fishing gear, manpower, or fishing longer. Over time, fishers can change vessel design and how they are equipped so as to pack more fishing power into a given capacity regulation. More generally, technological progress will over time erode the effectiveness of any regulation based on fleet capacity by increasing the effectiveness of a vessel of any given specification. This needs to be taken into account in any regulation based on fleet capacity. Experience shows that technical innovations and changes in fishing practices can rapidly erode the gains from reducing fishing inputs, and require further capacity reduction. Without implementation of rights-based management, the regulator and the vessel owners are locked into an on-going battle of buybacks and expanding capacity and effort.

Each new entrant to a fishery brings additional capacity and pressures on management. Therefore, limiting entry is a key element and first step in containing capacity. International laws as reflected in such instruments as UNCLOS, UNFSA² and the RFMO treaties provide support for limiting entry. In international tuna fisheries, specific methods are needed for handling the unused capacity options, whether time bound or open, of coastal developing countries and the fleet expansion plans of coastal and distant water fishing countries.

Experience with Use of Rights for Removing the Constraints

Determining the most appropriate rights system: The form of fisheries rights and the chances of management succeeding depend largely on the type of property rights system. Management systems can be based on a wide range of property rights types, on a continuum from open access to common property to private property, depending on the characteristics of the resource users and decision-makers. This

² United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement

Descriptions of Rights Types

1. Open access refers to unrestricted access to a resource.
2. Common property refers to exclusive use of a resource by a group. Limited entry, which restricts access to a fishery, can be viewed as a form of common property. Fishing cooperatives, in which a group of vessels hold the right to fish, are another form of common property. Spatial rights or territorial use rights for fisheries (TURFs) are a form of common property defined within a particular space. Common property includes property owned by a country, where rule-making authority is assigned to a public agency, and citizens have right to use the resource within established rules.
3. Private property assigns ownership to specified persons. Private property guarantees those owners control of access to their part of the resource and the right to the bundle of socially acceptable uses and benefits. An individual transferable quota (ITQs) is a right to a share of the sustainable target level of catch in a fishery.
4. Use rights are distinguishable from property rights. Property rights entail “ownership” of the resource stock itself but use rights do not. Use rights instead pertain to exclusive utilization or rights of access. Governments tend to retain ownership of the property and grant the right of use to individuals or groups. For example, Governments may retain ownership of ITQs, but lease use rights as annual catching entitlements (ACE).

continuum of rights reflects increasing exclusive use of the resource.

Which bundle of fishery property rights emerges depends on the political constraints in effect and the ability of users to manage their activities (including their ability to exclude others). For example, governments often establish laws that prohibit the alienation of the right to exclude others from the resource, which limits the type of property regimes that might be developed. Experience has shown that when resources can be well defined, costs and benefits can be apportioned more clearly, and there is greater likelihood of private property rights emerging, such as ITQs, which are a right to a share of the total sustainable target catch, or ITEs, which are a right to a share of the total sustainable effort. Private property more directly reduces the costs of using the resource by making the full costs and benefits clear to the decision makers.

When resources are less well bounded and defined, uses are more co-mingled, costs and benefits are more difficult to allocate among individuals and common property is more likely. Common property is more likely also when the decision makers are more numerous and heterogeneous, distribution of the costs and benefits are difficult, and resources are more shared. Common property can efficiently function when the group is small in numbers, more homogeneous, and its members share objectives.

Hybrid forms of property can also emerge, in which some aspects are collectively owned and other aspects are privately owned.

Estimating the Enhanced Economic Benefits, Gauging the Political Feasibility of the Transition: The most persuasive reasons to adopt rights-based fisheries management is that it will facilitate a sustainable fishery and will generate a larger stream of future economic benefits generated by a fishery's increased value. In the case of international tuna fisheries, the extent of the economic and fisheries resource benefits needs to be estimated, and the programs developed to deal with the socioeconomic and environmental concerns of the changes.

Even with a strong case for transition to rights-based management, the implementation will need a detailed stakeholder analysis of the political feasibility. Stakeholders – whether countries, fishing vessel owners, crew or cannery workers - can be persuaded to adopt rights-based fisheries management if they stand to gain a share in this greater benefit stream. Those uncertain or likely to be disadvantaged by the change may become committed to the transition if compensation is offered, for example through a vessel or license buyback program.

Limiting entry: Limiting entry is typically the first management step taken in establishing a rights-based management system, based on the principle of exclusive access to a fishery for a group of vessels. Limited entry for tuna fisheries entails a mixture of limited access to national jurisdictions and the high seas. Limited entry helps develop an environment that aligns the incentives of individual fishers with the social objectives in which fishers can work together to achieve sustainability. Thus, limited entry may be used as part of the

longer term effort to introduce rights-based management to address the situation of existing fisheries.

Limited entry is an imperfect right, because it does not define an exclusive link to the catch. However, limiting entry is a prerequisite for a capacity buyback program, since it defines the list of eligible fishers and/or vessels and otherwise vessels will enter the fishery as conditions improve after a buyback. Limited entry is often introduced based on the status quo, i.e. on a fisher's history in the fishery.

Limited entry is yet to be fully introduced into tuna fisheries. The IATTC's closed Regional Vessel Register is a form of limited entry. It is the most advanced limited entry system among the regional tuna management organizations, but still requires further improvement and strengthening.

Global tuna management solutions require a global international vessel register to underpin limited entry provisions. The Workshop participants stressed the importance of regional tuna management organizations understanding each other's limited entry provisions.

For example, the eastern and western Pacific Ocean tuna management systems are linked through some overlap in management jurisdictions, movement of tunas between jurisdictions, and some common fleets. Within the fishery area of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention, the 8 Pacific island countries in the Nauru Agreement have recently replaced the previous limited vessel entry scheme with a limited fishing day scheme, the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS). This is a form of individual transferable effort and represents a rights-based management system. The Workshop participants noted the VDS and recognized that further information was needed to understand its objectives and operations in reducing catch of key species such as bigeye.

Buyback programs: Buybacks of fishing vessels, gear, or rights (such as catch rights) can facilitate a transition to a longer-term objective of rights-based management. Buybacks are not necessarily required to move to rights-based management, because the internal restructuring of an industry after the introduction of rights-based management will reduce vessels. Buybacks may however be an important factor in facilitating a change to rights-based management as they will help the economic transition by "buying out" unnecessary sunk investment in human and technological capacity. Buybacks that are not followed by a rights-based framework do not however change the underlying incentive to add capacity. Buybacks in a multi-national tuna fishery need to be conducted by multiple nations. Multilateral buybacks are required in a trans-national tuna fishery. If not, unilateral buybacks by a single country simply remove fishing capacity from the nation itself and open up opportunities for free riding by other countries.

In a trans-national tuna fishery, buybacks and their financing may have to be rooted in individual countries, each of which must perceive that the buyback is in its best interests. Buybacks may also be tailored to allow for the expansion of economic activities by coastal countries. Compensatory mechanisms can address asymmetries among nations.

Buybacks may be conducted in multiple rounds, often because of budgetary limitations, but there can also be advantages related to learning as the buyback authority gains more information and experience. Conversely, as the number of vessels declines due to buybacks, costs can sometimes rise over time. Multiple rounds also facilitate tailoring the buyback by gear or method of fishing. Buybacks are often purchased by reverse auctions, in which vessel or rights owners provide a price which the buyback authority can accept or reject, starting with the lowest price, the next lowest price, and so on. More information is available to the buyback market than the alternative approach of a fixed price offered by the buyback authority, so that a reverse auction has the potential for greater cost effectiveness. In the IATTC area, buybacks could be aimed at one or all of purse seine and longline fishing in general and for dolphin or FAD purse seine fishing to achieve public good objectives such as biodiversity conservation.

Buyback programs can purchase the vessel and/or license. If only the license or right is purchased, the vessel is free to fish elsewhere. If only the vessel is purchased but not the permit, the permit holder can purchase another vessel (unless prevented by the program). If both the license and vessel are purchased, the price includes the values of both assets. Many programs must buy out many vessels or rights of access due to latent capacity (low activity vessels). Purchasing high activity vessels can be expensive and quickly use the entire budget while purchasing only a limited number of vessels. Reverse-bid auctions in which the buyer puts up the price are the most common form of buybacks. Even with such attempts to control price, buybacks can be costly. Additional but related concerns include whether or not to scrap the vessel or restrict their use in another fishery to preclude adverse spillovers into other fisheries.

The Japanese Government and the Organization for the Promotion of Responsible Tuna fisheries (OPRT) buyback of large-sized super freezer longline vessels offers a prominent case study of an international buyback over 1999-2003. This program by the Japanese and Taiwanese governments and industries consisted of the following five steps (two national and three multi-lateral steps). First, the Japanese government provided 350 million dollars to buy back vessels and cancel licenses of 20% (or 132 vessels) of its own longliners. The payments were made only after the scrapping had been verified. The final cost was about 2/3 of the expected cost. Second, the Taiwanese government and industry bought back and scrapped 183 vessels and cancelled the licenses. Those vessels are of their own flag or constructed by Taiwan and flying flags of convenience. The estimated cost was 270 million dollars. Third, the Japanese Government gave a loan (about 32 million dollars) to OPRT to buy back and scrap 62 flag of convenience longliners, originally constructed in Japan but currently owned by Taiwanese companies. In reality 43 such longliners were removed. This loan is currently being repaid by special contributions adopted for the Japanese and Taiwanese longline fishers, partially according to the quantity of landing. Fourth, sixty-nine flag of convenience longliners were transferred to Vanuatu or the Seychelles flag, paying 2 million dollars per vessel. The corresponding number of Japanese licenses was cancelled. Fifth, any super freezer longliners not registered by the OPRT would be considered as IUU vessels.

The buyback program reduced the numbers of longliners considered by the OPRT to be IUU vessels from about 300 to 30, and reduced total large longline fleet size considerably. However, contrary to the expectation, fleet reduction did not result in a higher catch rate or a product price increase, most likely due to the increased effort by coastal small-scale longliners, increased tuna farming activities and continuing high catch of juvenile tunas by purse seiners.

Start-up funds: Start-up funds are necessary to enable the transition to rights-based fisheries management by funding both buybacks to reduce capacity and compensation for those stakeholders initially disadvantaged. Ultimately, start up funds can be repaid from the future economic benefits generated by the fisheries' increased value.

Financing a multilateral buyback may involve a loan from an international institution. Such loans may require lending directly to the participating countries that will be responsible for repaying the loan. Countries can levy landings taxes to repay the loan, on the premise that fewer vessels catching the same quantity of fish can enjoy greater returns through more fish and lower costs from economies of scale. Higher prices would not be expected if the same supply of fish is generated.

Third Party Intervention: a third party can ease the transition to a rights-based management system by providing access to and/or responsible management of start-up funds. A third party should have a reputation for integrity, the ability to help overcome conflicts of interest, experience with development planning and management, knowledge of financial instruments, and the ability to command financial accountability from countries and RFMOs.

The Role of RFMOs: RFMOs have the knowledge of the tuna fisheries, the administrative framework, and some of the management systems necessary to facilitate the transition to rights-based management. RFMOs can also establish limited entry, a necessary precondition for rights-based fisheries management.

Enforcing Rights-based Management Systems: Property rights require enforcement and few effective alternatives are available for fisheries in the high seas. Enforcement of regulations and rights-based management in international fisheries will probably entail trade measures applied in a World Trade Organization-acceptable manner and withholding access to national waters and ports. Trade measures can limit imports, landings, and trans-shipment of fish to those that are caught inside of the regulatory framework.

Currently, some RFMOs use versions of trade measures to encourage participation and compliance. Some governments, and the United States and European Union (EU) in particular, are considering fuller application of trade measures to all fish imports. The specific ingredients of trade measures include: (1) lists of vessels allowed (or not allowed) to fish in the areas; (2) catch or trade documentation; (3) vessel monitoring; and ultimately, (4) members who refuse to import fish without documentation. Some RFMOs have tried versions of this approach, most fully ICCAT and CCAMLR, and through the

documentation requirements have decreased fishing outside of the regulatory process and encouraged states to join or cooperate with the organization. Potential difficulties with trade measures include comprehensive documentation/monitoring obligations, although these may also be part of ITQ documentation, and that the use of trade measures requires participation by major market and landing states.

Market instruments such as ecocertification, country (or waters) of origin labelling could be explored further for their ability to assist the enforcement and awareness of tuna resource sustainability. Certification programs, certifying compliance with sustainability criteria, including stock condition and harvesting methods, can provide additional incentives for all involved in the harvesting and consumption of tunas. The AIDCP came about as a result of US embargoes of nations fishing tuna in association with dolphins. The objective of the AIDCP was to reduce dolphin mortality caused by the fishery to biologically insignificant levels, and thereby gain access to the U.S. market. A global tuna program along the lines of the US National Marine Fisheries Service FishWatch Program, which provides seafood consumers with the facts they need to make informed choices regarding seafood, could support market oriented instruments.

Monitoring, Control and Surveillance, or MCS, underpins any form of rights-based management. An MCS system observes the fishing industry's activities as part of monitoring, compliance, and enforcement. The enforcement of any use or property right is fundamental to its exclusive use, adherence to the rules and laws of its operation and the overall fishery management system in which the right is embedded, and the right's overall effectiveness. For example, without a well-functioning MCS, the number of vessels operating in the fishery can expand beyond the limit of a limited access system, and effective MCS facilitates the compliance with individual quota holdings and helps limit discards of overages. A secondary but important task is data collection that underpins fisheries management and population assessments. Much of this data base is generated from the commercial fishery, and scientists' ability to make accurate predictions on sustainable target harvest rates is directly related to the completeness, accuracy, and reporting consistency of the data which the scientists use.

MCS is an issue across all forms of property and use rights, even open access because of the need for scientific monitoring and assessments. Weaker rights tend to require less detailed, accurate, and timely data for the enforcement of the right and the functioning of the right. Limited access requires the number and sometimes size of vessels, which can be verified on an annual basis. Transferable harvest rights require more information, including accurate, timely, and comprehensive data on quota ownership, including transfers, quota harvests to ensure that quota shares are not exceeded, and the scientific data base. Data on quota harvests cannot rely on simply personal records, but instead require data that are readily accessible and verifiable by third parties. Accurate and timely data on quota transfers are required to balance quotas and catches with quota shares.

Some MCS information is common to all forms of property rights. Gear restrictions and time-area closures for the purposes of sustainability require MCS, where on-board observers and/or periodic inspections at sea are necessary, since onshore inspections can

be easy to circumvent. At-sea transfers of catches can be used to deliberately misrepresent the harvester's identity, to circumvent catch or valid quota limits, or prohibitions for other sustainability purposes, and need to be addressed in any form of rights-based management with Total Allowable Catches (TACs) or other sustainability requirements. Measures of on-board catch data (including species composition) are only estimates, and accurate and precise information is not usually obtained until the first commercial transaction occurs, which is typically during unloading. The deliberate misreporting of landings distorts subsequent stock assessments, compliance with TACs and other regulations, and the functioning of any quota form of rights. Bycatch concerns are also common to rights-based management, and MCS that captures accurate information on bycatch that is discarded at sea can be important.

MCS relies on social norms such as the trust that fishers will abide by the rules, regulations, and laws on their own accord, but verification and documentation nonetheless remain important for sanctions on violators, assessments of populations, and development of sustainable target harvest goals. Information requirements increase with stronger and more comprehensive rights. Sanctions, such as penalties, for failure to comply with regulations should also be accompanied by every rights holder's belief that all others are complying with the rules and laws; otherwise incentives decline for compliance. Belief that there is a high probability that any non-compliance can be detected, with very little chance of error, requires effective MCS.

All MCS options come with direct costs. Observers, and especially high rates of observer coverage, help ensure the highest quality of data collection for scientific purposes. Some observers are only scientific, but other observers contribute to compliance through reporting of locations fished, fishing time, catch levels and species composition, fish age, gear type or method of fishing used, discards, high-grading, quota overages, bycatch, and other such aspects. Onboard observing systems entail high direct costs, which increase with higher rates of coverage.

MCS underpins rights-based management, but rights-based management also facilitates MCS by establishing incentives for providing accurate and timely data and for compliance. Rights-based management provides positive economic incentives for rights holders to comply with requirements for providing data and for compliance with quota holdings (and sometimes bycatch), because actions taken that hurt the resource lower the value of other holders' rights, but also the value of their own right. Thus rights-based management helps establish incentives for self-enforcement and self-compliance, both of which serve to reduce the MCS costs associated with command and control management. Countering this trend towards cost minimization of MCS with rights-based management is the increasing data and overall information requirement, although these costs tend to be increasingly borne by rights holders as the rights become more comprehensive. Although incentives grow for rights holders' responsibility in mutual enforcement and MCS activities, some activities are likely to continue to reside with the member state, since the property right for the resource stock and area fished are retained by the state and some functions are invariably retained by the management authority and the state. Ultimately, MCS requires some form of verifiable monitoring, auditing, and related activities

external to the rights holders themselves. Transnational fisheries further require MCS and enforcement to deal with the threats from vessels outside of the RFMO system (i.e. members and cooperating non-members).

A large set of MCS options are available, including a register of vessels, logbooks, Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS), shore-side monitoring, observers, surveillance by patrol vessels and aircraft, at-sea boarding and inspection, on-board video monitoring, audits of company records, and catch and trade documentation. Vessel registers are perhaps the most fundamental requirement, although they can entail considerable staff time and expense to maintain and keep current, especially in transnational fisheries. Register requirements, compliance, and maintenance differ considerably by RFMO, and the Kobe process recommends harmonization of registers across RFMOs. Logbooks provide records of catch, location and time, environmental conditions, and other information. Logbooks can be used for compliance and in some instances by providing scientists with detailed information. Logbooks are completed in the IATTC region but not always in the WCPFC region except within EEZs. Electronic logbooks and real-time reporting varies, and can be used as an indication of whether or not a vessel is in an approved fishing zone and for near real-time monitoring, especially for quota fisheries. VMS monitors the location, timing, and movements of individual fishing vessels to ensure that there is no fishing in closed areas or during prohibited times and that fish are caught where reported. VMS is currently used to electronically track vessels, and could be linked to electronic logbooks. VMS is centralized in the WCPFC; previously only in the Forum Fisheries Agency waters, but now this system has to be melded with the WCPFC. In addition to public surveillance, vessel owners are interested in tracking their own vessels.

Shore-side monitoring after each fishing trip measures fish, species composition, and length-frequency. It also verifies catches and provides basic reporting. Sampling problems can arise. Independence of the shore-side monitor and any on-board observer ensures there is no conflict of interest. In rights-based systems using quotas, fishers are required to call in their estimated catch, landing time, and port prior to arrival, which ensures that no fish are landed unmonitored. Advanced radar and navigation equipment increase the effectiveness of government surveillance. Patrol vessels with high operating speeds act as a deterrent. Aircraft are less effective overall, except for monitoring closed areas and times, although they can identify fishing vessels for closer inspection by patrol vessels. Independent observers and enforcement officials can use at-sea boarding from patrol vessels to examine catches in holds, fishing gear compliance, and other regulations. Currently, there are no at-sea boarding and inspection programs in the EPO, but there is agreement in the WCPO that any qualified member in the convention area can board and inspect on the high seas, although not within any EEZ unless there is prior agreement. The landings of individual vessels or companies can be verified by a detailed audit of company financial records, thereby bringing to light discrepancies in catches and sales. On-board observers are used by the IATTC, which has a model system based on the AIDCP with one hundred percent coverage (not strictly an IATTC requirement). As discussed above, observers can have both scientific and compliance focuses, but minimizing the actual compliance role of observers is recommended because they are out

at sea with fishers in a confined space for long periods of time. Once observing is completed, costs remain for debriefing, data compilation, and storage. An alternative to on-board observers is on-board video monitoring by one or more video cameras on the vessel. The cameras are sealed to prevent tampering and programmed to automatically record when appropriate gear are operated, and videotapes are subsequently removed and reviewed by the appropriate authority. While an alternative to on-board observers and cheaper, electronic observing via video is considered less effective and generally provides less general information. Catch and trade documentation provide MCS functions for both sustainability purposes and for enforcement and compliance with quota management. Transnational tuna fisheries typically entail considerable international trade of fish, loins, and processed product, so that accurate information on trade with linkages to catch help ensure MCS.

Trade measures, acting as a credible threat, are one of the few negative economic incentives available to enforce property rights, participation in (or cooperating with) RFMOs, and fishery conservation and management measures in general. The two basic trade measures are prohibition of imports and prohibition of landings, other port use, and trans-shipments from non-complying member and cooperating non-members of an RFMO and IUU fishers. Catch and trade documentation are fundamental to effective trade measures. For example, catches caught outside of the RFMO area require documentation on where, when, and how the fish were caught, attested to by a state authority. Member states can prohibit imports or transshipments of member fish without proper catch documentation or from states whose ships have been deemed to be fishing outside the RFMO regulatory process. Questions arise, such as domestic enforcement of trade measures, legality of some port state measures (such as the degree of control the port state can exercise over the vessel), falsification of information, difficulties of tracing fish from catch to market, consistency across RFMOs, and legality of certain applications of trade measures.

3. SOME OPTIONS FOR RIGHTS-BASED MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS FOR INTERNATIONAL TUNA

A number of options for Rights-based Systems for EPO tuna fisheries were discussed by the Workshop and compared with the status quo. These included universal ITQs, Country Allocations, and the use of a corporate structure owned by quota holders or government. The latter arrangement could be developed in a number of ways, the key features being to internalize transaction costs and to separate property rights from management and harvesting rights. For the purposes of comparison a particular corporate model was examined. Further work is needed to develop these models.

The current management of the fishery by the IATTC for the most part leaves the right to catch fish as a common property enjoyed by fishers from the members or cooperating non-members. There are national annual allocations set for bigeye tuna taken by longline, and fishing effort restrictions for purse-seine fishing. A complex property arrangement exists in the purse-seine fishery where fishing is subject to limited entry controlled by the IATTC Regional Register but purse-seine vessels may be removed from

the Register by their government. Positions on the Register are transferable. Generally management rules apply to the entire eastern Pacific Ocean including to waters under national jurisdiction, but closures of relatively small areas for limited periods have been used to reduce catches of small tuna. The IATTC may set TACs, effort limits, and monitor catch and fishing effort against limits. It maintains the regional vessel register, and operates a purse-seine observer program which monitors catches of target and associated species.

The IATTC members are responsible for making and implementing the Commission's decisions, implementing measures for their own public good within waters under national jurisdiction, and enforcement of all measures. Some members license foreign fishing vessels to fish within their zones under national jurisdiction.

The fishing industry participants are responsible for providing timely data reporting to the IATTC or government, compliance with rules of IATTC, and have a management advisory role. As required, they pay licence fees for access to EEZs and/or country contributions to IATTC.

The current system does not provide significant resource rents, which for the most part are generated by licence fees for access to EEZs.

Country Allocations

In this case, the participating countries agree explicit shares in the use rights to the tuna stocks. These rights can be defined either as (i) a fraction of the total allowable catch or as (ii) a fraction of total permitted fleet capacity. It is then up to each country to decide how these rights are used by its own fishers or those whom it authorizes to use these rights. It is by now well established that improved economic benefits will be attained if a country's fishing quota is divided into shares that are allocated among its fishing companies and made transferable, so that those who are willing to pay most for these rights can obtain them from others who are willing to part with them for less. The more secure and better specified these rights, the greater economic benefits can be expected. For rights defined as shares in fleet capacity there is less experience to count on.

Catch quota allocation is usually the preferred method of these two because it removes all incentives to race for catch. Catch quotas directly address the fundamental problem, which is limiting the total catch from a stock to what the stock will support, given the conditions of the stock at the time and taking into account the effect of present catches on the future yield capacity of the stock. At this point it is appropriate to stress that the catch quota allocation method will only work well if the cooperating nations are willing to limit the total catch in the way described. There are many examples where the catch quota method has achieved little or nothing because nations have papered over their differences by raising the total catch quota to a level that has accommodated their claims while being way beyond what the stocks are able to support, given present conditions and future catch prospects.

Separate catch quotas must be set for each stock. In addition, it may be necessary to set specific quotas for specific gear types, because the catches taken in one fishery may after some time affect the catch possibilities in another. A case in point is the purse seine fishery which in some or most cases exploits young age groups of tuna that, if spared, would become available for the longline fishery after some time. It may be necessary to set total catch quotas for several fleets fishing the same stock, such as purse seining with FADs, purse seining on non-associated schools, purse seining on schools associated with dolphins, and longlining.

Partly because different TACs must be set for different fisheries, and also because of difficulties in monitoring catches, it may be preferable to limit the fishery by total fleet capacity instead of by catch quotas. Fleet capacity is easy to monitor, given that it has been defined in easily observed units such as hold capacity. The problem with this method is that such definitions may have a tenuous relationship to the fishing power of the vessel and the amount of fish it can take at any given time. Furthermore it gives incentives to circumvent such regulations by maximizing the fishing power of a vessel for any given definition of its capacity, as described under the constraints sections above. Fleet capacity regulation may be supplemented by regulating the intensity of use through maximum allowable fishing days, according to the condition of the fish stocks at any time.

Universal ITQs

Universal ITQs involve the setting of a total allowable catch, with rights to catch allocated to individual fishing enterprises. This implies that countries would agree to give up their right to control individual harvesting rights. The rights in the fishery would be shares (fractions) of the TAC which would be owned as property in perpetuity or for a long period and would be freely tradeable. Each year a right would generate an annual catch entitlement (ACE) equal to the fraction of the TAC represented by the right. The rights in the fishery and the ACEs could be traded independently. The ACEs can be specified by gear type or method to account for the different effects of fishing associated with each gear type, for example a share in the TAC may generate 3 t of longline caught tuna, but only 2 t of purse-seine tuna. Spatial issues may be handled either by dividing the TAC or qualifying ACEs. The system may include limits on quota aggregation and/or constraints on places where fish may be landed.

The IATTC would be responsible for setting TACs and any differential ACE rates, would provide services such as monitoring in the area via its observer program and port monitoring, collect most of data and provide scientific advice.

The members are responsible for the IATTC decisions, ensure compliance of own flag vessels with management measures and may implement additional measures within waters under their jurisdiction. In some cases members collect and provide data to the IATTC.

The fishing industry participants are responsible for providing timely data reporting to the IATTC or government, compliance with rules of IATTC, and would have a management advisory role, particularly in respect of economically optimum TAC levels.

Resource rents or part of them would accrue to the members via mechanisms which might include quota auction, landings levy, and quota rental charge.

TunaCorp

As with the country model, the participating countries would agree explicit shares in the use rights to the tuna stocks. These shares would be the rights in the fishery expressed as a percentage of the TAC which would be owned as property in perpetuity and would be freely tradeable. As with the Universal ITQ model each year a right would generate an annual catch entitlement (ACE) equal to the fraction of the TAC represented by the right. The rights in the fishery and the ACEs could be traded independently and could be specified by species, gear type or other such qualifier as required.

The corporation (TunaCorp) would be owned by the members of the IATTC with shareholding in proportion to their ownership interest in the fisheries rights. Each year the countries would vest the catching rights (ACE) generated in TunaCorp to be managed to maximum economic benefit. Country ACE allocations could be allocated in a variety of means and may be encumbered according to the policies of the member whose rights they are associated with. Examples of encumbrances would be a requirement to land tuna in ports of a member or being allocated only to vessels flying the flag of a member. The system can use similar mechanisms to those of the Universal ITQ system to address spatial issues.

The IATTC members would have the same roles as those in the Universal ITQ system in setting the management framework and, in addition, would be the owners of TunaCorp and would determine the distribution of resource rents. Management services could be delivered either by TunaCorp, member countries or the IATTC as appropriate. TunaCorp would at the very least generate and allocate ACE, collect and distribute resource rents / management costs, maintain catch and quota registers, balance catch against quota, and apply penalties in some cases.

The fishing industry participants have similar responsibilities to those in the Universal ITQ system, but in some cases their reporting would be to TunaCorp.

Pros and Cons of the Options

The limited entry system of the IATTC is its main tool to stop further over-capacity of the eastern Pacific Ocean Fishing fleet. However, it is incomplete as it only addresses purse-seining, and is subject to increases in actual effort via technological advances and further investment. Furthermore the limit is much too high for the productive capacity of the stock. This incomplete definition (invariably the case for effort controls) and incompletely structured right leads to rent dissipation. The longline fishery is effectively controlled by country allocations of bigeye tuna, which provides the opportunity for countries to act to preserve rent as discussed above.

The differing interests of the members of the IATTC where there are no incentives to ensure the conservation of all stocks and the 'consensus' decision making system style has put agreement on effective conservation programs out of reach in recent years, and precludes any management aimed at maximizing economic benefits. As a result the only rents available in the fishery are obtained via the rights of countries to control access to their zones of national jurisdiction.

Universal ITQs: The advantages of the system of Universal ITQs over the status quo include the incentives to reduce overcapacity over time, increase economic efficiency, and incentives for collective action to maximise asset values, such as group enforcement.

Members are likely to see the reduction of their management control as a serious disadvantage, and this alone may be sufficient to make the system unacceptable. The monitoring and enforcement of the system will be much more expensive than the status quo, although if properly managed, increased resource rents will more than compensate those costs. There may be legal challenges to establishment of rights over what was previously common property. While international fisheries law is already moving in a direction that gives grounds for reasonable confidence that any challenge would be defeated, the very newness of the concept may itself provoke legal challenges, which may be seen as a potential transaction cost.

Country allocation: The country-specific allocation of quotas and fleet capacity is most likely to be the option acceptable to the countries involved at the present time and in the near future. It could, however, evolve into a supra-national approach if countries are prepared to see quota or fleet allocations migrate out of their jurisdictions, being instead satisfied with obtaining a share of the rents realized by the aggregate fishery. This could be accomplished by a fishing corporation in which individual countries hold shares that give them a share in the corporation's profit. This arrangement is further described above.

However, because it only creates rights at the national level it leaves the issue of optimal returns from the fishery dependent upon the internal management of catching rights of each member. There is a risk of agency capture when state ownership is retained.

The TunaCorp: The corporate model is extremely flexible and can capture full ownership incentives, arrests overcapacity, provides opportunities for rationalisation, and allows for sharing of resource rents. It provides a clear role for members in managing the fishing rights and in realizing a share of increased returns from the fishery. It also allows the possibility of partial gains by having each country decide independently whether or not they want to turn their country quota into ITQs and then allow trading.

As with the country allocation model, there is a risk of agency capture when state ownership is retained but the arms length management arrangements may raise the level of transparency to reduce this risk. The industry ownership incentives are limited although this could be addressed by allocating shares to industry or providing longer-term

ACE allocations in partnership with country allocations. The option is subject to the same legal risks as the option of universal ITQs.

The participants were not in a position to compare the models which were only developed in a preliminary way during the Workshop. However, they suggest that further work be put into developing the models and exposing them to discussion with a wide range of tuna fishery stakeholders.

FOLLOW UP ACTIONS

The Workshop discussed a number of follow up actions (listed below) that should be considered to advance the development of rights-based management systems in tuna fisheries.

1. Distribution of the Workshop Report to management agencies and organizations with suggestions that the ideas it contains be considered at the next joint meeting of tuna organizations.
2. Development of a concrete example management system for tuna fisheries involving the use of transferable quotas that could be examined in detail at a future workshop.
3. An estimation of the economic case for rights-based management in the eastern Pacific identifying the cost, the financial instruments that could be used, design of a buyback, and management system and the potential economic gain)
4. Political feasibility analysis for rights-based management of tuna fisheries
5. Follow up events during the next 12 months:
 - a. Engage IATTC member countries with 'idea products' of Workshop, including the, economic case and rights-based management examples from 2 and 3 above.
 - b. Industry oriented workshop held in Central or South America, to examine the example management system from 2 above.
 - c. A workshop at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies of the University of Southern California at San Diego focussing on EPO and WCPO fisheries with involvement of Pacific Island countries

SEEKING NEW WAYS TO MANAGE TUNA FISHERIES

WORKSHOP ON RIGHTS-BASED MANAGEMENT AND BUYBACKS IN INTERNATIONAL TUNA FISHERIES: SPONSORED BY IATTC AND WORLD BANK, 5–9 MAY 2008, IATTC, LA JOLLA, CALIFORNIA, USA

From the humble tuna sandwich to top-grade bluefin sashimi, worldwide demand for tuna is up. As a result, tuna resources will undergo greater fishing pressure, at a time when overfishing is taking place for most tuna stocks except skipjack tuna and most bluefin tuna and some bigeye tuna stocks are already in an overfished state. And as more vessels enter high seas and national fisheries, the economic benefits are draining away, too. International tuna management needs new approaches to make the fisheries sustainable and to stem the tide of economic inefficiency.

From 5–9 May 2008, experts in industry, academia, and government from 10 countries met to examine how rights-based management and buyback programs could transform tuna fisheries management. The meeting took place at the La Jolla, California, headquarters of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), and was co-sponsored by the World Bank.

The experts concluded that rights-based fisheries management (sometimes referred to as incentive-based management) offered the promise of achieving conservation and socio-economic objectives simultaneously. But to build this enhanced value, countries, regional tuna management organizations, and industry must agree on how to define and allocate the rights created.

First, an economic case for rights-based management options should be made to help persuade stakeholders of the benefits of using a new management system (an analysis of different stakeholders' interests and positions could aid acceptance). Next, entry to the fisheries must be limited, and likely complemented by buyback programs to remove vessels and compensate those disadvantaged by the change. Workshop participants favored coordinated vessel restrictions by the tuna management organizations, beginning with a global vessel register.

Rights-based management aligns public and private incentives for fisheries conservation by clearly defining and allocating rights, thereby harnessing fishers' motivations to achieve management objectives and increase the value of the fishery. Successful rights-based fisheries management must be supported by public research and effective enforcement, and it must be administered well. Iceland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Namibia, Chile, and the United States have all adopted some form of successful rights-based management for certain fisheries. In tuna fisheries, the Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP) minimized dolphin mortality from tuna fishing in the Eastern Pacific Ocean by allocating dolphin mortality limits directly to individual vessels.

Workshop participants recognized that moving from the status quo to rights-based management will not be easy. They devoted considerable time to discussing the constraints to the transition and available tools and experiences that could help overcome these challenges.

Among the new management options discussed were:

- A system of allocating catch or fishing capacity quotas to each country that is party to a regional agreement, including the coastal countries and the cooperating distant water fishing countries.
- A universal individual transferable quota system throughout the fishery. The participants felt this option would not be immediately acceptable to all countries because of their different needs and aspirations. Over time, the country allocation system could evolve into a supra-national system, as countries see they can reap more benefits from their share of those realized across the whole fishery.
- A corporate model, with member countries of a regional tuna management organization setting up a corporation that holds and allocates the rights to fish. The corporate model is compatible with the other models and could become an institutional element of a new rights-based system.

Achieving a new rights-based system will involve tackling some major challenges, including:

- How to harmonize the needs of all countries and the regional management organizations throughout the range of the fishery resource, and in light of the differing objectives of various countries. Coastal developing states seek to meet competing needs through fisheries, including food security, employment on vessels, vessel ownership fees or fees from foreign vessels, and returns from canneries and the fisheries support services sector.
- How to balance interactions across fleets (e.g., purse seine and longline), across fishing methods (e.g., purse seine sets on log-associated and dolphin-associated tuna schools), and across species (e.g., yellowfin, bigeye, and skipjack).
- How to enforce property rights in an international environment of sovereign states and in the absence of an overriding international sovereignty. The participants examined how international law, backed by trade and market instruments, can help. Enforcement can entail trade restrictions on imports, landings, and transshipment, as well as withholding access to national waters and ports. Market measures such as certification and country of origin labeling can further support trade measures. Fisheries monitoring, control, and surveillance will need to be adjusted for a rights-based system. Greater real-time capacity will be required for monitoring and documenting catch.

But the greatest and most immediate challenge is how to reduce fishing capacity and limit entry to the fisheries. Participants in fisheries with excess capacity are notorious for putting political pressure on management authorities to set unsafe catch limits in an attempt to satisfy the fleet. None of the five regional tuna management organizations have strong limits to entry of vessels. Although the IATTC imposes stronger limits than the others, it needs to strengthen its entry provisions as a first step to reducing capacity

and defining the pool of vessels/licences for allocation of rights, and as a basis for a possible buyback program.

Fortunately, a wealth of practical experience is emerging on buybacks, including their costs, how they can facilitate the management transition, and what factors can impede their success. Buyback and other compensation funds will need to be raised through governments. Multilateral financing parties with reputations for objectivity and integrity and with development planning and management experience may be needed.

The participants stressed that leaving the tuna fisheries as open access or subject only to weak management by controls on fishing effort and fleet capacity (i.e., input controls) would lead to more stock depletion and greater economic waste in the years ahead. The sooner a transition to rights-based management is discussed and implemented, the sooner value can be restored in global tuna fisheries.

Contacts:

A full report will be available at:

<http://www.iattc.org/IATTC-Other-Meetings-Buyback-May2008ENG.htm>

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Among the challenges discussed were:

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- How to balance interactions across fleets, fishing methods, and species.
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