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Tuna fisheries worldwide are important for both food and economic security. The economic value of
these fisheries is generally expressed as gross revenue, or landed value, essentially the product of the
ex-vessel price commanded by the fish species and the catch. This can lead to distorted perceptions of
the “value” of tuna fisheries. In this paper, we combine landed value, cost and subsidy databases to
calculate private rent from tuna fishing, in the case of the fisher or fishing company, and social resource
rent in the case of a country. Note that the data source we are using (Sea Around Us databased) is
currently being updated, and thus our estimates are still based on old data, but will be updated when
new data become available. We first present high level estimates for private and social resource rent
(i.e., including subsidies) for global tuna fisheries, then dig down for a deeper look at IOTC tuna fisheries.
While many countries subsidize their fishing activities, the degree of this differs markedly across
countries. The proportion of the landed value that is subsidized by IOTC fishing states ranged from about
10% (Maldives) to over 100% (Seychelles). Tuna fisheries around the globe, and indeed in the IOTC are
thus being propped up by distortionary subsidies paid by citizens in a given country to that region's tuna
fleets. In the absence of subsidies, it's quite likely that many fisheries would be unprofitable, and
therefore, would contain less fishing capacity. This is particularly important when it comes to discussion
around allocations being based on historical catch. Fleets that have been subsidized will likely have
caught more, meaning subsidies disproportionately impacts allocation decisions. Furthermore, subsidies
encourages increased capacity, which can undermine the conservation mandate of RFMOs.
